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Abstract—Passive human detection and localization serve as
key enablers for various pervasive applications such as smart
space, human-computer interaction and asset security. The pri-
mary concern in devising scenario-tailored detecting systems is
the coverage of their monitoring units. In conventional radio-
based schemes, the basic unit tends to demonstrate a directional
coverage, even if the underlying devices are all equipped with
omnidirectional antennas. Such an inconsistency stems from the
link-centric architecture, creating an anisotropic wireless propa-
gating environment. To achieve an omnidirectional coverage while
retaining the link-centric architecture, we propose the concept
of Omnidirectional Passive Human Detection, and investigate to
harness the PHY layer features to virtually tune the shape of the
unit coverage by ﬁngerprinting approaches, which is previously
prohibited with mere MAC layer RSSI. We design the scheme
with ubiquitously deployed WiFi infrastructure and evaluate it
in typical multipath-rich indoor scenarios. Experimental results
show that our scheme achieves an average false positive of 8%
and an average false negative of 7% in detecting human presence
in 4 directions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of wireless devices has triggered the triple
convergence of pervasive, context-aware and human-centric
computing, where the ability to detect nearby human presence
plays a central role in various scenario-tailored applications.
Particularly, the situation where the person carries no devices,
is termed as Device-free [1] or Passive Human Detection
(PHD). Device-free detection is especially advantageous in
secured region monitoring and emergency response like ﬁre
alarms. Such passive detecting manner is also crucial in
context-aware computing, due to the raising demand for differ-
entiated quality of location-based services (LBS). For instance,
infrared devices are commonly employed for directional hu-
man detection applications (e.g. the doors of elevators), while
museum exhibitions might expect disk detection range so as
to display item-speciﬁc information for surrounded visitors
in all directions. Although disk-like proximity detection can
be achieved by radar based techniques, the expense for the
dedicated infrastructure hampers viability. The pervasively
deployed WLAN, in contrast, also holds potential for such
purpose without extra cost. As an illustration, a laptop store
might exploit the computers on the shelves to detect nearby
customers in order to display their new properties, while
simultaneously rating the computers’ popularity according to
the total customer staying time.
The state-of-the-art in passive human detection varies in
the underpinning infrastructure [1] [2] [3] [4] [5], and the
monitoring unit can be either a single RX in camera-based
solutions or a TX-RX link in infrared and radio based methods.
In radio-based schemes, the impact of human presence on the
radio signals is correlated to certain variation of the received
signals, where RSSI enjoys sheer prevalence due to its handy
accessibility [1] [3] [6]. Nevertheless, RSSI tends to be a
ﬁckle indicator. To compensate for its unreliability, Wilson
et al. [3] proposed the Radio Tomographic Imaging (RTI),
which embraces the redundancy introduced by dense-deployed
sensors to visualize the human induced RSSI attenuations.
However, as the links are interweaved to create a redundant
network to ensure performance, failures of several links might
degrade the whole system. A disk coverage unit, on the
contrary, potentially decomposes the network and is more
ﬂexible in providing high-quality detection performance only
at the spots of interests.
Despite vast literature on radio-based passive human de-
tection and localization [1] [2] [3] [6], it is non-trivial to
obtain a disk detection coverage. The primary hurdle lies in
the transmitter-receiver (TX-RX) link architecture, which nat-
urally demonstrates a link-centric coverage. More concretely,
most experimentally ﬁtted coverage models for passive human
detection tend to have boundary shapes similar to a directional
ellipse along the TX-RX link [3] [6], rather than a disk
centered at the RX (Fig. 1). We therefore introduce the concept
of Omnidirectional Passive Human Detection (Omni-PHD), in
referring to the problem of realizing passive human detection
with a coverage of disk-like boundary, by employing link-
centric detecting unit architectures. Besides the application-
driven motivations for Omni-PHD, we also envision our work
as an effort towards bridging the gap between the theoretical
analysis of coverage problems in wireless sensor networks
(WSN) and the practical hardware performances [7] [8] [9],
as well as guidelines for applications such as monitoring [10]
localization [11], data collection [12], topology analysis [13],
etc.
We ground our Omni-PHD scheme on the ﬁne-grained
PHY layer features to virtually tune the coverage shape into
a more omnidirectional one by ﬁngerprinting the signatures
within the coverage. The advantages are twofold. On the one
hand, the PHY layer features portray the small-scale multi-
path components, and are more sensitive to human presence.
On the other hand, the structure of PHY layer signatures
is more temporally stable than the MAC layer RSSI, thus
possessing stronger resistance to background dynamics. Unlike
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conventional RSSI-based schemes which strive to mitigate
the rich multipath effects indoors, we exploit the multipath
components as signatures to detect human presence in a
reliable and omnidirectional manner. Our scheme is prototyped
with existing WiFi infrastructure leveraging the off-the-shelf
Intel 5300 NIC. Experimental results show both average false
positive and false negative along 4 directions of below 9% by
ﬁngerprinting, and around 10% by threshold based detection.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
• We introduce the concept of Omnidirectional Passive
Human Detection (Omni-PHD), which serves as an early
effort in breaking the limit of the link-centric unit archi-
tecture.
• We exploit the ﬁner-grained subcarrier information, i.e.,
the channel frequency response from the PHY layer, and
utilize it in the context of device-free passive human
detection. Our scheme is implemented on existing WLAN
infrastructure with off-the-shelf Intel 5300 NIC, requiring
no extra hardware support.
• We validate our scheme in various indoor scenarios,
including a vacant conference hall and a clustered com-
puter laboratory, and consider both stationary presence
and mobile user detection. Experimental results show an
average false positive of 8% and an average false negative
of 7% in detecting human presence in 4 directions.
In the rest of the paper, we ﬁrst provide a preliminary in
Section II, and detail our scheme in Section III and IV. Section
V presents the performance evaluation, Section VI discusses
the related work, and Section VII concludes this work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Passive human detection refers to identifying the presence
of a person by already deployed monitors, while the intruder
carries no detectable devices. It usually correlates the vari-
ations of certain signal features measured at a single or a
set of ﬁxed receivers with the environmental changes due to
human locomotion [1]. Two factors signiﬁcantly affect the
performance of device-free passive detection: (1) the basic
monitoring units, and (2) the measured signal features.
The primary concern in devising scenario-tailored appli-
cations is the coverage of the underlying monitoring units,
which is denoted as cell coverage. A crucial characteristic
of the cell coverage, is its boundary shape, which pictorially
delineates the directivity of the cell coverage. For instance,
infrared devices naturally possess a unidirectional cell cover-
age, and are commonly used in directional human detection
applications (e.g. the doors of elevators). However, a disk-
like cell coverage is preferable in other application scenarios.
That is, as depicted in Fig. 1, instead of the unidirectional cell
coverage Ω with sharp directionality along the TX-RX link,
we expect an omnidirectional coverage centred at RX with
radius r, like the region of A.
Achieving omnidirectional cell coverage, though, is non-
trivial in the context of device-free detection, which leads to
the omnidirectional passive human detection problem.

A
r??
Fig. 1. The Omnidirectional Passive Human Detection Problem
A. The Omnidirectional Passive Human Detection Problem
In the literature of radio-based device-free passive human
detection, most cell coverage models for monitoring units are
experimentally ﬁtted, and vary in directivity, even if the under-
lying devices are equipped with omnidirectional antennas [3]
[6]. This phenomenon stems from the link-centric monitoring
unit architecture and the passive nature of human induced
impact on wireless signals.
More speciﬁcally, given a ﬁxed distance from the RX,
the measured signal would undergo larger deviation from
the normal proﬁle with human obstruction in the direction
of the dominant paths (the paths with less attenuation). The
human body, though, acts as a near-constant signal absorber
at a speciﬁc location. Therefore, with human as the passive
source for signal deviation, while the TX-RX link sketches
the anisotropic propagating circumstance, the cell coverage
for omnidirectional devices tends to demonstrate sharper di-
rectionality in the direction of the dominating paths.
Therefore, the term of omnidirectional passive human detec-
tion refers to the problem of device-free detection with a disk-
like cell coverage, by employing link-centric monitoring unit
architectures with only omnidirectional devices. Two levels of
detection are envisioned:
• Equalized Decision: Determine whether a person presents
within a near-disk region or not, with equally guaranteed
conﬁdence along all directions.
• Azimuth Distinction: Discriminate the particular azimuth
of the human presence within a near-disk region, with
equally guaranteed conﬁdence along all directions.
Besides the challenges entailed by the link-centric architec-
ture and the passive source nature, it poses strict discriminative
requirements on the signal signatures to distinguish particular
azimuth. Yet we still consider omnidirectional passive human
detection promising for the following reasons. (1) Recent
advances in communication communities have shed light upon
extracting ﬁne-grained and robust signatures from the PHY
layer, while the state-of-the-art exploits the coarse MAC layer
features. (2) With ﬁngerprinting approaches, it is possible to
harness the anisotropic radio propagation circumstances to
virtually tune the shape of the cell coverage instead of avoiding
the multipath effects.
Although we mainly focus on Equalized Decision in this pa-
per, we also achieve reasonable results for Azimuth Distinction.
As detailed in Section V, our scheme achieves below 9% false
negative and false positive for Equalized Decision and above
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75% direction distinction accuracy for Azimuth Distinction.
However, we defer more comprehensive studies of the Azimuth
Distinction level in future work.
B. Signal Power Features
Before closing this section, we concisely review the avail-
able signal features on a commercial receiver.
RSSI dominates in current device-free detection schemes,
yet acts as a ﬁckle power feature. As a superposition of
multipath, it yields limited resistance to environmental noise,
thus derailing the accuracy of cell coverage models and
offering little ﬂexibility for omnidirectional detection. Diving
into the PHY layer, though, it is possible to resolve the alias
versions of superposed signals.
In typical indoor scenarios, a transmitted signal propagates
to the receiver through multiple paths, each introducing a
different time delay, amplitude attenuation, and phase shift.
To distinguish individual paths from the time domain, wireless
channel is portrayed as a temporal linear ﬁlter h(τ), known
as Channel Impulse Response (CIR).
h(τ) =
N∑
i=1
|ai| exp(−jθi)δ(τ − τi) (1)
where ai, θi and τi represent the amplitude, phase and time
delay of the ith multipath component, respectively, and N
denotes the total number of paths. δ(τ) is the Dirac delta
function. Nevertheless, constrained by the system bandwidth,
the time resolution remains at the granularity of discriminating
clusters of multipath components [14].
Alternatively, in the frequency domain, modern multi-carrier
radio such as OFDM provides a sampled version of Channel
Frequency Response (CFR) within the band of interest.
H(f) = [H(f1), ..., H(fK)] (2)
where each H(fk) is a complex number depicting the ampli-
tude and phase of the sub-carrier fk. CFR correlates with CIR
by Fourier transform:
H(f) = FFT (h(τ)) (3)
Leveraging the off-the-shelf Intel 5300 NIC with a publicly
available driver as in [15], a group of CFRs on K = 30
subcarriers is exported to uplayer users in the format of
Channel State Information (CSI).
In a nutshell, channel response exposes a ﬁner-grained
temporal and spectral structure of wireless links. The next
section strives to extract proper features from channel response
information for omnidirectional passive human detection.
III. FEATURE EXTRACTION AND CLASSIFICATION
Recently, there is an increasing interest in ﬁngerprinting
based indoor localization with PHY layer information [16]
[17]. Despite the literally similar requirements on signatures
for conventional indoor localization and passive human detec-
tion, there is a subtle yet fundamental distinction in between,
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Fig. 2. Amplitude of CIR and CFR
which impedes direct transplanting of the signatures adopted
in the former to the latter problem.
In indoor localization, the chosen signature is expected to
stay stable with all other persons’ presences in the environment
except the served user’s presence. Nevertheless, it is the
task for passive human detection to distinguish users near
the receiver and those faraway. Consequently, the extracted
features ought to be both (1) sensitive to human presence in
the vicinity and (2) robust to external background dynamics.
The above two requirements are the basis for our omnidirec-
tional passive detection scheme. The omnidirectional coverage
is further enhanced by the rich multipath effects indoors, which
sort of blur the link-centric property. For instance, a reﬂected
path from the back of the RX might also lead to detectable
variations on the received signals if one person presents there.
Nevertheless, RSSI features tend to be unreliable and coarse-
grained, thus unable to distinguish such variations from back-
ground dynamics. PHY layer features, in contrast, naturally
possess richer distinction and therefore are capable of reliably
discriminating variations induced by even subordinate paths in
all directions from background interferences.
For our scheme, we employ a K-dimensional vector of the
amplitude histograms of CFRs as the PHY layer signature,
and leverage the Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) [18] as the
metric for signature classiﬁcation.
A. Sensitivity to Human Presence
As discussed in Section II, the rationale for passive human
detection is that a fraction of propagating paths would be
affected due to intruder presence. In the time domain, this
contributes to changes on the corresponding paths, which are
portrayed as the disturbances of CIR. From the frequency
perspective, these changes are captured by the variations of
frequency diversity, which are reﬂected by CFR.
Although CIR and CFR are equivalent in modeling channel
responses, their amplitudes differ in sensitivity to human
presence. We collect CSIs for situations with one person
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Fig. 3. Density Distributions of CFR Amplitude
presents at two spots in a conference hall (Spot 1 and 2 in
Fig. 2), and also for the normal course with no one around.
For each case, raw CSIs from 2000 packets are recorded,
which are then transformed into CIRs and CFRs as in Section
II. Fig. 2 depicts the average CIR and CFR amplitudes in
dB. As is shown, notable ﬂuctuations of CIR locate narrowly
around the 5th time index, while the deviations of CFR span
across the entire subcarrier indices. The physical underpinning
is that the temporally separable multipath components twist
in the frequency domain. Although human locomotion usually
changes only a subset of paths, even a small portion of affected
paths would signiﬁcantly change the CFR amplitudes across
all the subcarriers, since an impulse function δ(τ) contributes
to a constant across the entire frequency range. Hence CFR
is more preferable in passive human detection due to its
sensitivity to human locomotion.
Furthermore, CIR features extracted from current commer-
cial WiFi infrastructure suffer two limitations:
• The 20MHz bandwidth in 802.11n yields a time resolu-
tion of 50ns, while the typical indoor maximum excess
delay is smaller than 500ns [19]. Hence only the ﬁrst
10 out of the 30 available CIR components are relevant
to multipath effects. Instead, each component in CFR
represents the amplitude and phase on one subcarrier.
• The lack of TX-RX synchronization makes it difﬁcult to
align the multipath components w.r.t. the ﬁrst arriving
path. CFR naturally avoids this problem as each compo-
nent corresponds to a ﬁxed subcarrier.
B. Resistance to Environmental Dynamics
Another major concern for passive human detection is how
to derive CFR features that are resistant to irrelevant dynamics
while retaining sensitive to humans in the vicinity. And we
mainly exploit the structure of CFR.
To identify the CFR amplitude structure’s resistance to
environmental noise, we collect three sequences of CFR
amplitudes, each derived from 1000 packets. The ﬁrst case
is measured with no one around while in the second case,
3 men stroll at random in the room but keep away from
the TX-RX link (3-5m away). The third case denotes the
situation where one person stands 0.5m away from the RX
(Note that although the azimuth of the person matters, the
following qualitative results still hold). Fig. 3 demonstrates
the density distributions of the CFR amplitudes. The upper
two ﬁgures verify the stability of the CFR structures as in
[17] while the uppermost and the lowermost conﬁrm that the
CFR structures would disperse in case of close obstruction.
Therefore, the amplitudes of CFRs discriminate the irrelevant
background unstableness from the desired local perturbations
due to human locomotion, which is almost impossible with
RSSI based descriptors [20].
Moreover, despite dispersing, the probability density distri-
bution (pdf) of CFR on each subcarrier still acts as a discrim-
inative signature. As validated in Section V, the histograms of
CFR amplitudes alone have offered adequate discrimination
for both the Equalized Detection and Azimuth Distinction
levels of omnidirectional detection.
C. Modeling CFR Amplitude Features
Although CFR consists of both amplitude and phase in-
formation, we only adopt the amplitude of CFRs for two
concerns.
• Despite that phase information enriches the feature space,
it needs careful calibration to mitigate dramatic drifts
due to external noise [21]. The amplitude of CFR, in
contrast, remains sensitive to human activities in the
vicinity, yet pertains the spectral structures in case of
external perturbation.
• According to our measurements, the phases on a portion
of subcarriers tend to be uniformly distributed, which
possess limited location-dependent distinctions.
Fig. 4 demonstrates the pdf of the complex CFRs measured
in the third case of Fig. 3. While the complex CFRs on
subcarrier 30 can be well represented by a single cluster,
the complex CFRs on subcarrier 4 demonstrate a circle-like
distribution, with almost uniformly distributed phases within
the entire (−π, π) range. The only difference is that the
amplitudes of CFRs on subcarrier 30 spreads out to near zero
values, while for subcarrier 4, the amplitudes of CFRs vary
within a range relatively faraway from zero, which contributes
to a circle like distribution in the complex plane.
The circle-like distribution makes it difﬁcult to model the
CFR signatures by clustering. We thus leave out the uniformly
distributed phase information and employ the amplitude dis-
tribution on each subcarrier only, and model it as a histogram.
Albeit simple, the histogram representation avoids the over-
ﬁtting problems induced by pdf estimation. We validate the
feasibility of the histogram approach in Section V.
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To sum up, we employ the histograms of all the CFR ampli-
tudes for a group of K accessible subcarriers −−→hist(‖H(f)‖)
as the proposed PHY layer features:
−−→
hist(‖H(f)‖) = [hist(‖H(f1)‖), ..., hist(‖H(fK)‖)] (4)
where K = 30 in our case, and each hist(‖H(fk)‖) is
calculated within a pre-deﬁned time window W .
D. Signature Classiﬁcation
In comparing the similarity between two histograms, we
adopt the Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) [18], which is a
cross-bin similarity metric to calculate the distances between
histograms or probability distributions. EMD is analogous
to the minimal effort to transform one pile of earth into
another one. In general, the EMD measures the dissimilarity
between two signatures P = {(pi, ui)}mi=1 of size m and
Q = {(qj , vj)}nj=1 of size n, where ui and vj denote the
positions of the ith and jth elements in each signature, and pi
and qj represent the corresponding weights, respectively. The
EMD between P and Q is then calculated as [18]:
EMD(P,Q) = min
F={fij}
∑
i,j fijdij∑
i,j fij
(5)
with the constraints:
∑
j
fij ≤ pi,
∑
i
fij ≤ qj ,
∑
i,j
fij = min{
∑
i
pi,
∑
j
qj},
fij ≥ 0
To compare the distance between two histograms, each
histogram is regarded as a signature, for each histogram bin
can be considered as an element in a signature. Accordingly,
the histogram values act as the corresponding weights in the
signature, while the indices of bins serve as the positions in
the signature.
Since the raw CSI data reported are at the granularity of
1dBm (equivalent to the precision of 1dB when comparing
the differences between two amplitudes), the number of bins
to calculate the histograms is also set to ensure the granularity
of 1dB. In our measurements, the ﬂuctuation range of most
CFR amplitudes on a single subcarrier is around 20dB, we
therefore set the number of bins for each histogram as 20.
We then calculate the EMD for each subcarrier before
adding the K = 30 EMDs into a single distance as the
similarity between signatures s1 and s2. The rationale to
calculate the EMD separately for each subcarrier is to preserve
the spectral structure. The ﬁnal summation is due to the
fact that the subcarriers in OFDM fade independently. As a
consequence, each subcarrier weighs equally in calculating the
total dissimilarity between the two vectors.
IV. HUMAN DETECTION
In this section, we detail our Omni-PHD scheme. The CSI
sequences reported from the RX are ﬁrst converted into the
amplitudes of CFRs (measured in dBm). The histograms of
CFR amplitudes for K subcarriers are calculated for a set of
packets within a ﬁxed time window W .
To determine whether there is an intruder within the cell
coverage, we adopt the prevalent ﬁngerprinting based approach
in literature of indoor localization.
The ﬁngerprinting approach consists of two phases: training
(a.k.a. calibration) and monitoring [22]. The ﬁrst stage in-
volves a site-survey process, in which a tuple 〈s, l〉 is recorded
to correlate a location l with a measured signature s. The
signature for all intruder locations are measured and pre-stored
in advance to construct a ﬁngerprint database. Next during the
monitoring stage, the RX measures a new signature st within
a time window W and calculates the distance between st and
the normal proﬁle Sout (termed as d(st, Sout)) as well as the
distance between st and all the signatures Sin = {si|i ∈ I},
where
d(st, Sin) = min
si∈Sin
d(st, si) (6)
And I is the set of the indices for all signatures in the database
with an intruder within the cell coverage. If d(st, Sout) is
smaller than d(st, Sin), then a ’detected’ event is announced.
To improve the reliability of detection, we employ a slid-
ing window approach with step size s. More speciﬁcally, if
the signatures calculated for N consecutive sliding windows
{W1,W2, ...,WN}, all resembles more to the signatures with
intruders, then a ’detected’ event is announced. As for the
Azimuth Distinction level, the direction (including the normal
proﬁle) with the highest similarity to the measured signature
is returned as the estimated intruder’s azimuth.
Note that in passive detection, users carry no devices. Hence
unlike in conventional indoor localization, the calibration stage
for passive detection is less error-prone to improper usage
of devices and thus relies less on professionals to conduct
the calibration. Also, for Equalized Detection, since it only
involves two scenarios (user detected and no one around),
it is possible to only randomly measure a few signatures as
ﬁngerprints for the case with intruders, especially the direction
backwards the TX-RX link. In all, the calibration efforts in
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Fig. 5. Multipath-scarce Scenario Fig. 6. Multipath-rich Scenario
passive detection is comparably reasonable with respect to
those in traditional ﬁngerprinting.
V. PERFORMANCE
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
device-free detection scheme in various indoor scenarios, con-
sidering multipath-rich environments, background dynamics
and both stationary presence and mobile user detections.
A. Experiment Methodology
During our evaluations, we employ a TP-LINK TL-
WR741N wireless router as the transmitter operating in IEEE
802.11n AP mode, and a LENOVO laptop equipped with
Intel 5300 NIC as the receiver downloading packets from
the AP. The ﬁrmware is modiﬁed as [15] to export channel
state information (CSI) of each packet, i.e., a group of 30
channel frequency response (CFR) for further analysis. The
transmission rate is 20 packets per second. We elaborate the
settings of experiments in detail as follows.
The measurements are conducted in two representative
indoor scenarios: a conference hall and a small computer lab
(Fig. 5, Fig. 6). The former is relatively vacant, while the latter
is piled with desks and computers, creating rather complex
wireless propagating environment.
During the experiments, we denote one pair of AP location
and laptop location as a link. In the hall scenario, we ﬁrst put
the AP 2m above the ﬂoor and on the ﬂoor, respectively, and
ﬁx the laptop 0.6m above the ﬂoor. For each AP placement,
we pick two different laptop locations. For the lab case, the
AP is about 1.2m above the ﬂoor, and we choose 3 laptop
locations. Therefore, we have measured 4 links in the hall and
3 links in the lab.
For each link, we collect data with a person standing in 4
directions around the laptop at the distances of 0.5m and 1.0m,
respectively. We also record the normal proﬁle, i.e., when there
is no one around. Hence, each link has 9 testing cases.
For each of the 9 testing cases, we collect CSIs for 1 minute
and employ them for the ﬁngerprint database. To collect test
samples, we measure CSIs for the 9 testing cases for about 30
seconds on each link, from which the CSIs of 6 seconds are
randomly picked as one test sample. We repeat the collection
with 9 different persons at the 4 directions for both the range of
0.5m and 1.0m, thus obtaining 9 test samples for each intruder
case. Finally, we collect 9 sets of CSIs when there is no one
around as the test samples for the normal proﬁles for each
link. To identify the robustness to background dynamics, half
of the test data are measured when there are 3 men strolling
in the test room, but keeping away from the TX-RX link for
at least 2.5m.
The ﬁngerprint database for each link is built up as follows.
For database within coverage of radius 0.5m, only the training
data collected within 0.5m are employed (i.e., 4 intruder cases
and those for the normal proﬁle). For the database of 1.0m,
all training data are used.
To evaluate the scheme’s realtime performance, we let
one person faraway from the receiver (about 2.5m away)
walk towards the receiver and then walk away again, from 4
directions w.r.t. the receiver for one link in the hall scenario.
We mainly focus on the following metrics to evaluate our
detection scheme. (1) False Positive (FP): The fraction of cases
where the receiver announces a ’Detected’ event when there
is no one within the disk range. (2) False Negative (FN): The
fraction of cases where there is an intruder within the disk
range, but the receiver fails to detect him.
Further, to represent how ’directional’ the cell coverage is,
we borrow the mathematical form to measure the directivity
of a radiation pattern in the antenna jargon. For instance, a
monitoring unit capable of detecting intruders in all directions
within a disk range of radius r0 with equal detection rate
P , would hold zero effective directionality, and therefore the
directivity D of this monitoring unit at radius r0 would be 1
or 0 dB. Mathematically, the directivity of a monitoring unit
at radius r is deﬁned as:
Dr =
1
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
pr(θ)dθ
(7)
where pr(θ) is the normalized with maximal equal to 1.
pr(θ) =
Pr(θ)
Pr,max
(8)
where Pr(θ) is the detection rate in the direction of θ at radius
of r and Pr,max is the maximum detection rate in all directions
at radius of r.
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B. Static Detection Performance
Fig. 7 demonstrates the false positive (FP) and false negative
(FN) of the 7 links at radius of 0.5m and 1.0m, respectively.
The average FN / FP across all the 7 links are 7.9% / 4.8%
for the 0.5m range, and 6.9% / 6.4% for the 1.0m range. The
reasons for such low FP and FN are twofold. One the one hand,
ﬁngerprinting approach compensates for the potential FN since
it occurs only when the intruder’s impact on wireless signals is
quite different from all the ﬁngerprints in the database. Further,
with ﬁner-grained CFR features, the distinction and location-
dependence of the signatures have both improved considerably,
compared with a single valued and unstable RSSI. On the other
hand, the low FP owes to the resistance of the CFR feature to
irrelevant noise.
Comparing the performance of the range of 0.5m and 1.0m,
we see a slight rise of average FP from 0.5m to 1.0m. This
is because the farther the intruder presents to the RX, the less
severe impact the received signals would undergo. As a result,
some test samples might resemble more to the ﬁngerprints at
1.0m in the database, which contributes to a FP. We ﬁnd no
obvious performance gap between the relatively vacant hall
and the clustered lab, which indicates that the feasibility of our
scheme even in scenarios without abundant multipath effects.
Taking a closer look at the detection performance in detail,
we evaluate the directivity of the cell coverage, i.e., the
average detection rate for each direction w.r.t. the TX-RX link.
Fig. 8 demonstrates the detection rate (DR) and the direction
distinction accuracy along 4 directions (denote the direction
along the TX-RX link as 0 degree, and follow a clockwise
direction) including both the hall and lab scenarios.
As depicted in Fig. 8, the detection rate for each direction
is around 90%, while the direction distinction accuracies
reasonably ranges from 76% to 85%. The directivity at radius
1.0m is therefore approximately DDR,1m ≈ 0.17dB with the
metric of detection rate while DDA,1m ≈ 0.58dB with the
metric of direction distinction accuracy. The sharper directivity
measured in direction distinction accuracy reveals that the
signatures against the TX-RX link (0 degree) still holds less
distinction compared with those along the TX-RX link (180
degree), which is ruled by the underlying anisotropic signal
propagations. That is, when the user stands backwards the
TX-RX link (0 degree of azimuth), it might be classiﬁed into
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other directions or the normal proﬁle, since a user with such
location tends to introduce similar extent of variations on the
received signals. For the Equalized Detection level, though,
the differences between the normal proﬁle and all cases when
there is a user nearby is comparatively larger. Hence the
CFR signature proves to provide sufﬁcient distinction from
the normal proﬁle, and the detection rate along each direction
is comparably uniform.
C. The Impact of Window Size
Since the window size represents the realtime performance
of the detection, we measure the variation of FP and FN with
different window sizes. Fig. 9 demonstrates the avearage FP
and FN across 7 links at the radius of 1.0m with a window
size range of 2 seconds to 10 seconds. Both FP and FN
drop gracefully with the increasing window sizes since the
histograms measured within longer time intervals generally
incur less random noise. On the other hand, both FP and FN
retain within 10% even with a window size of only 2 seconds.
This indicates that the ﬁngerprinting based scheme is feasible
for realtime detection as long as the intruder stays within the
range for about 3 to 4 seconds (accounting for both the window
size and software delays).
Fig. 10 further illustrates the detection rate and direction
distinction accuracy across each direction. Again, the per-
formance along each direction tends to be insensitive to the
variation of window size. Furthermore, for direction distinc-
tion, the direction towards the TX-RX link (180 degree) still
enjoys the highest classiﬁcation accuracy, indicating that the
coverage shape of the proposed scheme is still not perfectly
omnidirectional. Finer-grained and more effective features ex-
tracted from channel responses might ultimately contribute to
a perfect disk-like coverage, even for the Azimuth Distinction
level.
D. Mobile Detection Performance
This experiment shows the realtime performance of our
scheme with real mobile traces. Fig. 11 illustrates the detection
results for a mobile user. The window size is set to 2 seconds,
with a sliding step size of 0.5 seconds. At ﬁrst, the measured
signatures bear more resemblance to the normal proﬁle, i.e.,
with smaller EMD to the signatures for the normal proﬁle. In
the time interval of 5.5 to 9.0 seconds, the distances between
the measured signatures in each time window and the intruder
signatures drop smaller. Therefore the RX announces a series
of ’detected’ events during this interval. The variation trends
of the two sequences of EMDs demonstrate the feasibility
of the proposed scheme in detecting mobile users who are
approaching and walking away from the receiver for Equalized
Detection. Nevertheless, the accuracy in discriminating the
direction of the mobile user is less satisfactory due to the small
window size and the uncertainty induced by mobility. We
leave the more quantitative study on the mobile user detection,
especially the Azimuth Distinction level to future work.
VI. RELATED WORK
Device-free Passive Systems. The concept of radio-based
device-free passive localization stems from the seminal work
by Youssef et al. [1], which localizes or tracks a person
carrying no radio enabled devices based on his impact on
the wireless signals. Most device-free systems exploit the
handy signature, RSSI, from either WiFi enabled monitors
[23], or ZigBee sensors [6]. Despite its easy accessibility,
RSSI ﬂuctuates considerably even at a stationary link [14],
which makes it an unreliable indicator to human presence.
To achieve high robustness, Wilson et al. [3] proposed the
radio tomographic imaging (RTI) technique, which exploits
the redundancy introduced by sensor arrays surrounding the
monitored region to visualize the human-induced RSSI ﬂuctu-
ations. Nevertheless, the dense deployment of sensors impedes
its viability. To provide guidelines in devising optimal sensor
deployment topology and placement, an in-depth scrutiny on
the performance of the basic monitoring unit is indispensable,
which grounds the primary purpose of our work.
Coverage Modeling. The coverage modeling serves as
a fundamental issue in the coverage problems of wireless
sensor networks [7] [8] [9]. Both disk-like [7] and non-disk
[9] models are used, yet these coverage models tend to be
the compromise between theoretical simplicity and practical
feasibility. In the literature of device-free systems, most cov-
erage models of monitoring units are experimentally ﬁtted and
vary in shapes. Zhang et al. [6] employed an eclipse coverage
centered in the middle of the TX-RX link, while Wilson et
al. [3] used an oval coverage with foci at TX and RX. These
models demonstrate a link-centric property [24], even with
omnidirectional antennas. Only very recently did Patwari et
al. [25] propose a spatial model for human induced RSSI
variance from a statistical perspective. We also target at the
detection performance in the context of device-free systems,
yet our effort deviates from previous research in that we strive
to extract PHY layer information instead of the dominant MAC
layer RSSI, and target at an omnidirectional range.
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PHY assisted Indoor Localization. Originated from wire-
less channel sounding, Nerguizian et al. [16] leveraged the
ﬁner-grained PHY layer signal power features for indoor
localization with dedicated infrastructure like Vector Network
Analyzer (VNA). The PHY layer feature, channel impulse
response (CIR) and its frequency domain counterpart, channel
frequency response (CFR), are capable of discriminating mul-
tipath components, which is impossible with RSSI alone, the
MAC layer superimposition of multipath signals. Recently, a
thriving trend in PHY assisted indoor localization is to exploit
modern radios such as OFDM to obtain PHY layer features
with off-the-shelf hardware. Sen et al. [17] employed the rich
multipath information in CFR for ﬁngerprinting based spot
localization, while both Wu et al. [14] and Sen et al. [26]
extracted information about the direct path from CIR. The
former takes the direct path power for accurate ranging, and
the latter transforms the body blocking effect with respect to
the direct path into reliable AoA information for triangulation.
Our work builds upon this thread of research in device-based
localization, but emphasizes more on the interplay between
directional properties and the signal power features in device-
free scenarios.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this study, we demonstrate that the PHY layer information
unfolds new possibilities for passive human detection, hence
holding potential for breaking the limit restricted by link-
centric architecture. On observing that the statistical spectral
structures of small-scale multipath signals possess resistance
to irrelevant background dynamics while retaining sensitivity
to nearby human locomotion, we propose to leverage the
histogram feature of the subcarrier amplitudes as signatures
for our omnidirectional passive human detection. Experimental
evaluations considering the richness of multipath, background
dynamics and mobility have validated the feasibility of the
Omni-PHD scheme, with an average false positive of 8%
and false negative of 7% in detecting human presence in 4
directions. We envision this work as an early step towards
passive human detection with ﬂexible coverage, which acts as
a crucial concern in human-centric computing.
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